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DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN STATE LABOR LEGISLATION
By FOwLIR VINCENT HARPZR*
PART THREE
VI.
Some Conclusions About Due Process of Law
With this material in mind, is it possible to arrive at any useful
conclusions as to what constitutes -due process of law in labor legis-
lation? In each group of cases, there seem to be two distinct,
though inseparable functions of the judicial process of reviewing
the legislation in question. The courts, in brief, are arriving at con-
clusions both of fact and of law. The impression was, at one time
prevalent that the extent of review of certain types of labor legisla-
tion was limited to the reasonableness of the" statute as respects the
end sought and the means of attaining that end, upon the facts as
presented to the court. The same was contended with respect to
legislative review in other fields,29 0 for example, review of rate
fixing activities of administrative boards.29 1 It was thought that the
court could not substitute its own conclusions of fact for the find-
ings of the board or legislature. But this position seems to have
been abandoned as far as rates were concerned since J920,292 and
so far as labor legislation was concerned, courts have long since
done what amounted to arriving at independent findings of fact.
It has been a necessary complement to determining the question of
*Professor of Law in the University of North Dakota.
290"This Court is slow to declare that the State legislature is wrong in
its facts." Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572, 57 L. Ed. 971, 33 Sup. Ct.
61o. "Only in exceptional cases that this Court does not accept facts as
found by the State Supreme Court." Portland R. R. Co. v. Oregon R. R.
Comm., 229 U. S. 397, 57 L. Fd. 1248, 33 Sup. Ct. 820 (1913).
29 1New York and Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345, 62 L. Ed.
337, 39 Sup. Ct. 122 (1917).
2920hio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 64 L.
Ed. 9o8, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (1920).
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law involved, for it is impossible to find the law until the facts are
determined.
293
A great deal has been said about the question of reasonableness
in general, whether it be a question of law or a question of fact.
The query has been answered in so many ways in different types
of cases294 that one is quite confident that the vital matter in most
of them is whether the question should be decided by the court or
by the jury. In reviewing legislation, however, all questions are
for the court, so the distinction is of little practical importance.
For purposes of analysis, however, it seems better to recognize
what Austin long ago pointed out, namely that the matter of reason-
ableness is neither a question of fact nor one of law, but whether
the given law is applicable to the given facts.2 95
But here, indeed, is the clue to the judicial process in legislative
review. Given the facts, the court must then "apply" a principle of
law to arrive at the solution of the question of law. To do this,
the application of the standard of reasonableness is necessary, to
determine whether the principle of law is applicable to the given
facts. But this standard is essentially a moral standard, for the due
process of law clause has grafted directly on to our constitutional
law, a standard from the science of ethics. 29  This standard is, at
293Cf. Holmes in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 21o, 227, 53
L. Ed. I50, 29 Sup. Ct. 67 (29o8): "A judge sitting with a jury is not com-
petent to decide issues of fact; but matters of fact that are merely premises
to a rule of law he may decide."
294Depending upon whether the "facts" were disputed or not.
295"And this, I suppose is what people were driving at when they have
agitated the very absurd question whether questions of this kind (reasonable-
ness) are questions of law or fact * * * The truth is that they were questions
neither of what the law is, or what the fact is, but whether the given law is
applicable to the given fact." Lecture VI, Jurisprudence I, 230 (5th ed., 1911).
296"A great and increasing part of the administration of justice is achieved
through legal standards. These standards come into the law, in the stage of
fusion or morals, through theories of natural law. They have to do with
conduct, or with conduct of enterprises, and contain a large moral element.
* * * They are applied according to the circumstances of each case, and within
wide limits are applied through an intuition of what is just and fair, involving
a moral judgment upon the particular item of conduct in question." Pound,
Law and Morals, 6o (i924). Cf. Holnws, Comnwn. Law, 1io, 111 (1881).
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least in legal theory, an unvarying one,-17 and all differences in re-
sults are due to differences in the factual content of the situation
from which the question arises.
298
Apparently, then, the first thing to do is to look at the methods
of arriving at the facts. If the correct solution of the problem of
reasonableness lies in seeking the relationship between the facts
and the law, an inadequate determination of the facts is fatal to a
sound rseult.
The greatest danger in the past has been that the courts have
not felt the necessity or recognized the importance of a correct
analysis and determination of the facts in this type of case as a
preliminary function to determining the relationship of the law
thereto. The process that actually takes place is, of course, one
that it is difficult to analyze, but the two distinct determinations
are actually occuring nevertheless. Too often, however, courts have
been content to arrive at conclusions from metaphysical premises
by a strict adherence to the logic based upon the "jurisprudence of
pure conceptions." Thus, for example, the court in Ritchie v. Peo-
ple,299 steeped in a century old natural law philosophy, announces
that women have a natural equality with men, and consequently
legislation involving classification based upon the difference in sexes,
such as fixing the hours of labor, must necessarily be unconstitu-
tional. Premises of this kind have not infrequently resulted in a
perfectly undesirable conclusion through a perfectly logical process
of reasoning. 00 But the realities of life are ignored; facts, as those
most affected and concerned know them, are disregarded, and what
Dean Pound calls "mechanical jurisprudence" 3°1 defeats a juris-
prudence, tuned to the realities of the society which it is intended
29 7"Law is or ought to be, a progressive science. While the principles of
-justice are immutable, changing conditions of society * * * make a change in
the application of principles absolutely necessary to an intelligent administra-
tion of government." State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, 7o Pac. 52 (1902).
29 8 Cf. Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, 532. Cf. also Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., syllabus 2, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1927). See also Harper, "Natural
Law in American Constitutional Theory," 26 Mich. L. Rev. 62 (2927).
299i55 Ill. 98, 4o N.E. 454, supra.
30°Cf. the cases considering and condemning payment of wage statutes,
ante, pp. 33-37.
30'See 8 Col. L. Rev. 605 (x9o8).
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to serve.30 2  The classic observation of Mr. Justice Holmes that
the life of the law has been experience rather than logic, seems
charged with profound significance. 303
The real objection to the so called "jurisprudence of concep-
tions," so frequently referred to in contempt, is not that it is a
jurisprudence of conceptions, but rather that in the use of concep-
tions, the facts are ignored, that is to say, the conclusions reached
by the deductions from legal conceptions, are not.continually tested
and criticised, pragmatically, (i) by the principles rather than the
rules of the authorities, i.e., the precedents; and, more important
still, (2) by the facts in the particular case, for in handling con-
ceptions there is ever the danger of getting away from realities, and
forgetting that the conceptions are, after all, a means to an end, and
of treating them for their own sake, as an end in themselves.
The methods by which courts have apprized themselves of the
essential facts in cases under discussion have been subjected to some
extensive development. Upon the theory of judicial review, the
court is confined to the evidence as set forth in the record.304 The
adjudging of the evidence is not included within the function of
a court of review. This limitation, when strictly adhered to not
only results in decisions wanting in soundness but places the courts
in the embarrassing position of being obligated to determine the rea-
sonableness of a situation, most of the vital and significant facts of
which are beyond their knowledge, and, what is worse, not avail-
able to them. Thus courts have complained because of insufficient
evidence from which an intelligent conclusion might be reached.30 5
30 2Cf. Pound, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 146, discussing "American judges who
insist upon a legal theory of equality of rights and liberty of contract in the
face of notorious social and economic facts," citing Lochner v. New York,
Adair v. United States and others. Cf. also Pound, "Liberty of Contract," 38
Yale L. 1. 454, 468 (199o).
303Cf. Pound, "Liberty of Contract," supra, 464.
304See, for example, State v. Barba, I32 La. 768, 772, supra, where the
court, invalidating an eight hour act for stationary firemen, observed: "There
is no suggestion in the record that the occupation of a stationary fireman is
dangerous or unhealthy to such degree as to warrant the interference of the
State. * * *"
3o5See People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, 410-411, supra, where
the court complains of the insufficient evidence in People v. Williams, 189
N. Y. 131, supra, decided seven years before.
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The court in People v. Schweinler Press30 6 was so reluctant to
pass upon the constitutionality of the act before it, without as much
information as possible, that it expressly considered and referred to
the report of the investigation commission appointed by the legisla-
ture, defending its right to rely upon this information, thus,
"In the decision of the legislature whether it should adopt such
legislation, and in the determination by us whether the legislature
was justified in idopting it, that body was and we are entitled to
take into account the report made by the commission ......
The record, then, at best, is unlikely to provide sufficient facts
to support a thorough consideration of the real issue, and frequently
leads to results, both undesirable and unscientific. Under such cir-
cumstances, in the absence of other fact-finding machinery, courts
have found themselves pitifully handicapped. Sometimes the record
will disclose testimony and opinions of an expert nature by men
of science, calculated to be of some assistance to the courts,307 but
in other situations such evidence has been excluded.308
In 19o8 a new devise was instituted in the Oregon hours of
labor case"00 when Mr. Louis Brandeis submitted several hundred
pages of scientific data demonstrating the effect upon the child-
bearing capacity of women of excessive fatigue induced by long
hours of toil. The Court was asked to take judicial notice of this
material on the ground that it consisted of facts established by
science and by experimentation, and could therefore be assumed to
be within the knowledge of the Court. The material had been avail-
able to the Court had they cared to go to the exhaustive trouble to
secure it for themselves. Attorneys, however, by incorporating it
in their brief, had merely made it more accessible.3 10
306SuPra, 404.
30 71n People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 2 N.E. 29 (1885).
308 1n State v. Cantwell, 179 Mo. 245, supra, expert testimony which tended
to show that underground work such as that contemplated by the Missouri
statute fixing hours of labor in mines was not attended with danger to the
health of those engaged in working therein, was excluded. The court argued
that the validity of laws enacted in the exercise of the police power could
not be made dependent upon the views of experts as to the necessity of such
enactment. For similar ruling, see Ex parte Kair, 28 Nev. 127, supra.
3 0 9 Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S. 412, supra.
3 1
oSee ibid, 42o.
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Three years before, the Court in the Lochner case31' had made
mention of the common understanding: "To the common under-
standing the trade of a baker has never been regarded as an un-
healthy one." In the Muller case, it appears that the effect of
fatigue upon the child-bearing functions of women is a matter of
general knowledge, or that which is known and intelligible to the
common understanding. In the Schweinler case312, the New York
court had resorted to matters of common observation: "We know
as a matter of common observation that such labor is generally per-
formed indoors and that under average conditions and surroundings
existing in factories, even when performed in the daytime, it is
ordinarily arduous and exacting." 313
Apparently matters of general knowledge and of common un-
derstanding should be called to the attention of the courts. But the
common understanding is not altogether a safe guide to determine
the constitutionality of a law. 14 Some such matters may be taken
into consideration as the subject of judicial cognizance, without spe-
cial attention directed to them while still other must be incorporated
in counsels' briefs and arguments. Just how far data and evidences
of facts contained in sociological briefs influence, or are seriously
considered by the courts, it is hard to say. Since 19o8, counsel for
both sides of contested labor laws have, of course, availed them-
selves of the results of extensive researches in social phenomena,
of a more or less accurate nature. In theory, it is doubtlessly quite
possible and rational for courts to make use of this material. A
great deal of it is unquestionably of much value: a great deal more
is probably quite as.valueless and inaccurate, 15 for it is not dif-
311198 U. S. 45, Supra.
312214 N. Y. 395, sup'ra.
'
313bid, 401.
314Cf. Freund, "Limitation of Hours of Labor and the Federal Supreme
Court," 17 Greent Bag, 411, 415-416 (1925).
315Cf. Burke Shartel, commenting on the Michigan sterilization of mental
defectives case, Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 4o9, 204 N.W. 140 (1925):
"The legislature is not heard, nor is the court required to have any part of
the legislative record before it. The court must depend chiefly on the briefs
of counsel for evidence of the facts as well as for the usual legal argument.
* * * The difficulty with those ways of getting at the facts is not much dii-
ferent from the difficulty we would see in having the jurv get its knowledge
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ficult to find facts to support a conclusion charged with vital in-
terest to litigants.
It can not be denied, however, that the sociological brief, the
value of which rests upon the theory of judicial notice, is a tremend-
ous improvement over the older methods of acquiring an extensive
familiarity with the facts in such cases. A good many years before
Mr. Justice Holmes had written:
"I have in mind an ultimate dependence upon science because
it is finally for science to determine, so far as it can, the relative
worth of our different social ends, and, as I have tried to hint, it is
our estimate of the proportion between these, now often blind and
unconscious, that leads us to insist upon and to enlarge the sphere
of one principle and to allow another gradually to dwindle into
atrophy."' 10
But is the sociological brief the best possible way of engaging
the results of science to serve the law? Many of the same objections
lie to such briefs as are applicable to expert testimony. Perhaps the
greatest of these is that they are partisan, and when science is em-
ployed for partisan ends, it is seldom undiminished in scientific
value. At best, it is difficult for science, thus presented, to enlist
the confidence of the public, be they friends or foes to particular
social legislation. And yet, courts must have information, in some
way or another. They are continually confronted with issues, the
settling of which demands equipment and machinery which they
do not have available. There are many students of these matters
who believe that, to keep pace with progress and to satisfy the de-
anywhere and everywhere. The facts simply can not be adequately tested and
proved without some real opportunity to explain and controvert, and even
more important, without a real opportunity for the court itself to investigate
the facts. In the case before us we see brought out the weakness of these
haphazard ways of getting at the facts. * * * Indeed a reading of all of the
opinions will convince anyone familiar with the subject that none of the
justices understands very well the nature of the social problems arising from
feeble-mindedness or the medical procedures in sterilization, though the nature
of those problems and the seriousness of the treatment or operation seem to
be highly important in deciding whether sterilization is an arbitrary and un-
constitutional measure." "Sterilization of Mental Defectives," 24 Mich. L.
Rev. I, 2o (1925).
31OScieixe in Law--Law in Science, Collected Papers, 242, (1920).
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mands of the future, some surer and more accurate method of de-
termining facts must be devised. A number of years after the in-
troduction of the statistical brief, Mr. Felix Frankfurter, himself
well trained in the preparation of such documents, expressed him-
self.
"With the recognition that these questions raise substantially
disputed questions of fact, must come the invention of some ma-
chinery by which knowledge of the facts which are the foundation
of the legal judgment may be at the service of the courts, as a regu-
lar form of the judicial process. This need has been voiced alike
by lawyers and judges. '317
And Dean Pound, expressing a similar conviction, insists: "It
is not one of the least problems of the sociological jurist to discover
a rational mode of advising the court of facts of which it is sup-
posed to take judicial notice." 318
The sociological brief is inadequate, unsatisfactory and uncon-
vincing, to say nothing of the inconvenience attending the courts'
effort to carefully consider and sift the significant fact from the
chaff which invariably accompanies them. Both judges and scholars
realize the imperative demand for reliable and expeditious sources
of data, prepared and determined by men trained in the particular
science or field of knowledge involved in litigation.
But changes come slowly, and judicial machinery must, perhaps
necessarily, be the last to permit of instrusions, save by cautious
and deliberate steps. Nevertheless the profession is facing the situa-
tion realistically and rationally. In January 1926, Dean Henry
Bates, in an address before the Nebraska Bar Association at Omaha,
proposed a solution, pregnant with significance and potentialities.
Referring to the Law Schools of the larger state universities, Dean
Bates, declared,
"A legal research bureau established in connection with such
schools might conduct researches in the legal and economic or other
fields concerned in legislation under review by the courts, and upon
request or suggestion of the court furnish valuable studies to those
317
"Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law," 29 Harv. L. Rev.
353, 372-373 (i916).318Publication. of the American Sociological Society, 7, 148, 161 (i912).
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tribunals in the performance of their delicate and difficult task.
Such a bureau should be composed of lawyers trained in the work
of investigation, and the staff should include economists, sociologists,
accountants, and statisticians, to investigate whatever province of
knowledge may be indicated in relation to the matter before the
court. Legislation regarding taxation, transportation, regulation and
rate-making for public utilities, labor, and in fact all economic and
social welfare legislation, involves matters of this kind. Under
competent legal direction and only under such direction, can we
hope for investigations and studies which will be of aid to the courts.
To be sure there are in existance vast stores of scientific information,
data and statistics, but coordinated or correlated in no way, 'with
legislation or legal principle. Such coordination is the work of
lawyers. The information thus supplied would, of course, not take
the place of evidence, expert testimony, or any of the other sources
of information, at present available to the court. It would be ad-
visory only and in no legal sense controlling upon the judges. It
would be a substitute only for the speculation, guesswork, reaction
to prejudice and other motivating concepts, now lumped together
as matters of 'judicial cognizance.' Such information thus would
tend not to displace, restrict or limit the judge in any respect, but
would give him valuable and dependable information regarding the
fact foundation upon which a statute must be supported or set aside."
Here is a suggestion which indicates that the time is ripe for
lawyers to attempt a solution of this complex problem. Our courts
are carrying a heavy burden, and relief must come from within the
profession in the immediate future if they are to discharge their
duties intelligently and satisfactorily. Facts are the sources and
the causes of the law. Out of the facts arise the jurisprudence of
real life, and this jurisprudence, to live and grow, must be kept in
close and immediate contact with the realities of life, for in those
realities its roots are inextricably embedded.
Given a correct understanding of the facts, derived from reliable
and scientific sources, there still remains the application of the
standard of reasonableness to determine on which side of the line
the preponderance of interests involved lies. There seems to be two
methods of application, which may be called the subjective an he
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objective methods. These methods were early distinguished in libel
cases, in determining whether a new trial should be granted. The
"subjective" method was enunciated in Soloman v. Bitton,1 9 but
Lord Halsbury laid down the true rule, the objective standard, in
Metropolitan R. R. v. Wright.
32 0
It is obvious that if the former method of applying the standard
is indulged, in reviewing labor legislation, courts do little more than
substitute their notion of reasonableness for that of the legislature ;321
if the latter method is adopted, the courts do naught but establish
an outside limit beyond which the conclusion of reasonable men shall
be conclusively presumed not to extend.3 22  In general, it has been
declared that a presumption always exists in favor of the con-
stitutionality of legislative enactments.3 2  This resolves the proposi-
tion that if reasonable men might find the statute reasonably related
to an end fairly within the police power, due process is satisfied.
Examination indicates that in the early labor cases, where the valid-
ity of the acts was frequently denied, the courts were either ignor-
ing the facts, 24 or they were failing to apply the objective standard
of reasonableness.3 2 On the other hand, the later cases, and many
3198 Q. B. D. 176 (i881). "* * * the rule on which a new trial should
be granted on the ground that the verdict was unsatisfactory as being against
the weight of evidence, ought not to depend on the question whether the
learned judge who tried the action was or (was) not dissatisfied with the
verdict, or whether he would have come to the same conclusion as the jury,
but whether the verdict was such as reasonable men ought to have come to."
Ibid, 177.
32o0I App. Cas. 52 (1886). "If the word "might" were substituted for
"ought to" in Solomon v. Bitton I think the principle would be accurately
stated." Ibid, I56.
321See Bikle, "Judicial Review of Questions of Fact Affecting the Con-
stitutional Validity of Legislative Action," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 6, (1924). Cf.
Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution, 247 (I9II). Cf. Hall, Popular
Government, 187.
322See Thayer, Legal Essays, 27 (1908). Cf. Freund, "Constitutional
Limitations of Labor Legislation," 4 Ill. L. Rev. 6og, 622-623 (igio).
32 3See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162 (i8oo); McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, supra; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pa., 232 U. S. 531,
"upra.
324See Re Jacobs, supra; State v. Goodwill, supra; Frorer v. People, supra;
State v. Loomis, supra.
3
2
5Lochner v. New York, supra; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra.
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dissenting opinions of the older cases, -indicate that the objective
standard was the one employed. 32 6
Professor Kales attempted to show that inasmuch as there were
,dissenting opinions in such cases as Lochner v. New York, the ob-
jective standard either was not applied, or was impossible of ap-
plication. 27  It is true that intelligent men have differed. But the
question involved in' the objective standard is not whether there
actually be reasonable and intelligent men who disagree, but whether
the individual judge can understand and admit that an intelligent
man may reasonably do so. Thus it is declared:
"One has only to look at the Lochner case, the Adair and Cop-
page cases, Smith v. Texas, the Upper Berth case, to find that acts
which intelligent dissenting judges could regard as falling within the
formula of the law teachers, were held invalid. This demonstrates
the futility of the formula, and a legal formula which does not work
in a close case is not of much use to council. 3 28
This objection, however, is more apparent than actual. The ob-
jective standard does not necessarily demand that the judge regard
the dissenting vote of an intelligent brother on the bench, as con-
clusive of what the reasonable man may do, unless he, the judge, can
himself recognize the grounds for that dissenting vote, and fairly
grant their reasonable validity. The difference is not unlike that
between the weight of the evidence, and evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt, that marks the distinction between the subjective and the
objective standards. So long as courts must grant that reasonable
doubts exist as to the validity of the statute, its constitutionality
may not be put in issue. Mr. Justice Holmes has ever insisted
upon the objective application of the standard. Mr. Frankfurter,
some years ago, wrote of the venerable judge:
"He has ever been keenly conscious of the delicacy involved in
reviewing other men's judgment, not as to its wisdom, but as to
326Cf. Radice v. New York, supra; McLean v. Arkansas, supra; dissent-
ing opinion of Holmes in Lochner v. New York and Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, supra.
s27"Due Process, the Inarticulate Major Premise, etc.," 26 Yale L. .
539, 522-523 (1917).
32812 Pol. S. Rev. 241, 243.
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their right to entertain the reasonableness of its wisdom. We touch
here the most sensitive spot in our Constitutional system. ' 329
And yet Mr. Justice Holmes has held acts unconstitutional. 3 0*
He, perhaps more than any other member of the Supreme Court, has
been slower to invalidate legislative enactments, because of his strict
adherence to the objective test, always examining closely to eliminate
his own prejudices and to entertain nothing of the subjective ele-
ment in his decisions. In what perhaps is his best known dissent,
he said:
"The accident of our finding certain opinions natural and fa-
miliar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judg-
ment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict
with the Constitution of the United States."' 33 1
The ever constant fear seems to haunt the learned justice that
in his own thinking, he may exclude that which intelligent men find
reasonable, because of his own lack of experience. "Judges," be
declares,332 "are apt to be naif, simple-minded men, and they need
something of Mephistopheles. We too need education in the obvi-
ous-to learn to transcend our own convictions and to leave room
for much that we hold dear to be done away with short of revolu-
tion by the orderly change of law."
The fact situation, however closely connected with the issue, must,
in theory be kept apart as a separate process. In applying the doc-
trine of the reasonable man, he must be understood to be completely
apprised of all the facts, as the Court know them. What the rea-
sonable man would hold to be valid under a knowledge of certain
facts by no means imposes the obligation to hold the same act valid
with a knowledge of certain other facts. It is precisely this adjust-
ing of the conclusions, to accord with variations in the factual situa-
tion that distinguishes the standard from the legal principle, or still
more, from the rule of law. After the facts are once determined,
the reasonable man is resorted to. The judge certainly is no more
32
"Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes," 29 Harv. L. Rev. 683,
686 (igs6).
33OFor example, Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.
S. 522, supra.33
'Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75.332Speeches by Oliver Wendell Holmes, 98, IOI.
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this reasonable man than the legislator. He is as hard to find as
the individual for whom Diogones sought so diligently. He is but
a standard, a conception set up by the law, and ,must necessarily
be an objective one. As soon as he becomes subjective, he loses his
identity and becomes one with the court. The reasonable man, as
an hypothesis, has then vanished.
From this estimation of the process of the courts in reviewing
labor legislation and in the light of the results reached, several dis-
tinct movements seem to be apparent. In the first place there is
a growth of an honest realism in the attack upon such problems.
Courts are not only aware that great masses of factual matter are
necessary to an intelligibile conclusion, but they show, on the whole,
a kindly attitude toward any attempt to make such material available
to them. About all that is lacking is proper agencies to place the
scientific resources of the State at the service of the judiciary in this
work. The most important part of the problem namely, the recogni-
tion that there is a vital need for such fact-finding agencies, seems
to, be fairly solved. Apparently the courts are willing to make rea-
sonable use of the results of scientific investigations and researches,
if the same can be brought to them in a reasonably convenient man-
ner. At least there is not the blind approach to such matters that
characterized the early stages of judicial review of such legislation.
This it seems, may be interpreted as an immeasurably hopeful indi-
cation of an intelligent solution of the more complex problems of
this nature which are inevitably bound to absorb the attention of the
judiciary in the future.
Secondly, there seems to be a.more or less stable philosophy of
law being gradually substituted for the older naive notions of "nat-
ural law," "fundamental principles of justice," "inherent rights of
man" and the like, "which in some form or other, crept into late
nineteenth century and early twentieih century opinions. The idea
that "liberty" and "freedom" are some God-given attributes which
no law can take from man, that they are absolute, inviolable rights,
inalienable from man's estate, has, in large measure, though perhaps
not entirely abandoned. In its place, a sociological conception of
liberty and freedom has evolved which recognizes that in their con-
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crete manifestation these proud heritages of the common law are
but relative, rather than absolute.
This new "freedom" is recognized in the developdement of the
weapons of labor unions such as the strike, the boycott, and the
practice of picketing. 3 Social and economic inequalities are conse-
quently cut down to the end that, though the liberty of a few may
be continually and increasingly curtailed, there is being realized,
by way of compensation, the fuller liberty of great classes. From
being an individual conception, liberty, under pressure of democracy,
has become a social ideal. In some phases of the law governing the
relations of capital and labor, there have been recent decisions not
at all reassuring. The Journeymen Stone Cutters Decision,33 ' for
example, seems reactionary. But matching the Stone Cutters case is
Exchange Bakery v. Rifkins,333b in which the court of a leading in-
dustrial state recognizes the economic facts and implications of col-
lective bargaining, as they affect the laborer, as certainly as the rights
of the employer in his business.
A new conception of "property" has materially interfered with
the hallowed mediaeval conception of liberty as well as older notions
of property. Thus the worker is enabled to secure constitutional
protection to his "property" right of economic or industrial reputa-
tion, in witness whereof may be cited the service letter laws.334
But what has become of the old dogma of natural law advocates
that there must be, and there is, in constitutional law as elsewhere,
an unchanging principle of justice, which is the key to the solution
of every problem? Has this idealistic dream been forever shattered?
We do not understand it so. The doctrine of reasonableness has, it
seems fair to say, taken its place in the category of a pure, formal
idea or conception of relationship. Labor laws are reasonable, rela-
tively, or unreasonable relatively. This is not to say that the con-
ception of reasonableness is a changing one. Such language as that
of Mr. Justice Eakin indicates otherwise:
333See ante, p. 242 and notes.33 a'Bedford Stone Cutters v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Assn., 274 U. S.
37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522 (1927) ; see comment in 37 Yale L. I. RD (1927).
3 33b2 4 5 N. Y. 26o, I57 N.E. 130 (1927) ; see comment in 37 Yale L. 1.
249 (1927).
334See ante, pp. 44-45.
MICHIGAN LAW RFIEW
"* * * but, because of confusing the power (police power) itself
with the changing conditions calling for its application, many of the
definitions are inexact and unsatisfactory. The courts have latterly
eliminated much of the confusion by pointing out that, instead of
the power being expanded to apply to new conditions, the new con-
ditions are, as they arise, brought within the immutable and unchang-
ing principles underlying the power." 335
But we see that laws are not reasonable or unreasonable per se.
They are not, merely, as laws, with or without due process of law.
They possess or want the quality of reasonableness, as they relate
to situations and circumstances only. In the earlier cases these facts
were inconsequential and the circumstances immaterial. It was "too
plain for argument" that a law restricting hours for which a laborer
might contract to work was unconstitutional, regardless of and in-
dependent of facts.33 6 But now the reasonableness of such acts
depends upon the relation between the means and the end, or, in its
objective application, what reasonable men might find such a rela-
tionship to be.
Thus we preserve our unchanging idea of reasonableness, but it
becomes, not an ideal pattern which we hope to reproduce in our
actual laws in positive form, but that "unattainable and yet sure
guiding star" which, though we know it to be but a standard, we will
rely upon it to keep us on our path,33 7 and headed aright.
History, then, serves a different purpose in such matters. No
longer, save in the exceptional instance, 38 is it used to fashion
premises for arriving at results. We are developing a more philoso-
phical conception of history. We may look to this mass of de-
cisions on the validity of labor legislation with Hegelian eyes, as
the gradual unfolding of our idea of due process of law. Not that
it is to be found, in any decision, or any language, but that, in view
of the constant evolution, we may catch the principles which unify
335Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 59, 532, supra. "
33OPeople v. Orange Co. Road etc. Co., 175 N. Y. 84, supra.
3 3
7See Stammler, "Fundamental Tendencies in Modern Jurisprudence,"
2 Mich. L. Rev. 862, 884 (1923).
338Such as Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra, and perhaps Myers v.
Nebraska, 262 U. S. 39o, 67 L. Ed. io42, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923).
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and rationalize these decisions. 339 'We reject history as the limits
of the unfolding idea, but regard it merely as indicating the direction
in which we may expect it to be manifested.
Lastly, this realism in searching for solid factual grounds for
decision; these socialized revisions of older absolute notions of prop-
erty and freedom; this slow development of the objective standard
of reasonableness to the position of the Platonic idea,340 Stammler's
"sure guiding star ;" all this has given rise to the ultimate result of
"due process of law" functioning, in the legal order, as a legal norm,
determined by the mores of the day, the time and the place. Thus
we find latitude for the development of new social interests, and a
legal theory for their protection.
The variation in the moral sense alters immediately the intensity
and the quantity of interests, on one side or the other of the balance.
One result of later years is undoubtedly a different attitude toward
life, health, and comfort. The social and moral value of these at-
tributes, and hence their legal value, have undergone tremendous
change. It must not be forgotten that courts of less than forty years
ago were denying that the public had any interest in the health of
large classes of laboring men. 34' But with the idea, among intelli-
gent persons, that the standard of what is and what is not moral
should be predicated upon something which resembles what the new
psychology calls behavioristic ethics, rather than mediaeval notions
of theology, the impression has begun to take form that anything
is moral which contributes materially to the biological welfare and
physical well being of the community.
So as our standards of morality change, likewise does the norm
of due process produce different results. As the number of en-
lightened members of society increase, so must the standards be
raised. As physical science becomes more and more effective to
demonstrate the effects upon society of certain institutions and
habits, what was once regarded as an "unreasonable" restriction
upon individual interests becomes at once both moral and reasonable,
339See Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, 31 (1922), cited, ante, p. 5.
34OSee Joseph H. Drake, "Juristic Idealism and Legal Practice," 25 Mich.
L. Rev. 571, 573-574 (1927).
34'For example, Re Morgan, supra, pp. 21-22.
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and therefore constitutional. Bfit with this broad latitude for social
experimentation, the test still remains whether reasonable men might
conceive or understand how the means might accomplish the ends.
Paradoxically as it may seem, we have developed a philosophy
which attains the compromise between stability and elasticity. It
has achieved what no other system of natural law has ever succeeded
in attaining, namely, adjustability to the time, place, and condi-
tions.3 42  This is possible because of the constant and unvarying
form, although the matter and content change. Thus realism has
crept into our philosophy as well as into our science of law.
No longer do we content ourselves with bald and patently inade-
quate abstractions. Other systems of natural law have failed for
these reasons. And yet the legal order cannot be maintained without
something of permanence and fixity. In the past, natural law has
produced only the illusion of permanence. 343 It could not with-
stand the force of progress. No place has this pressure been felt
more than in constitutional dogmas of liberty and property in labor
regulation. And yet out of the ruins of the old, the new structure
has been built, with provisions for the very things which its pre-
decessor wanted. Industrial progress is recogn'zed as creating
new situations to which the legal norm can be applied to weigh the
various interests involved without changing the constitutional pro-
tections and guarantees in the least.3 44  The police power is not
expanded, but "new conditions are, as they arise, brought within
the immutable and unchanging principles underlying the power."
The formal element thus remains unchanged. Only the content
varies.
Thus we have, at least in part, begun to realize a correlation of
philosophy, of history, and of science, to produce, so far as our
problem is concerned, a veritable "natural law with a changing con-
tent,"845 to the end that law may better be adjusted to fulfilling the
3 4 2Cf. Berolzheinzer, World's Legal Philosophies, 410, 413, 414 (1924).
343Because of the "notion of an ideal form of the social status quo" Cf.
Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 35.
344Cf. Harper, "Natural Law in American Constitutional Theory," 26
Mich. L. Rev. 67 (1927).
34"See Stanmnler, Theory of Tustice, 107 (,925).
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wants of men. Philosophy of law here seems tending, judging from
the evidence in labor cases, to make law elastic whereas for a cen-
tury it had made it fixed and certain. 346 But in so doing, it seeks
to avoid the mistakes of four centuries ago. Its constancy is
recognizedly a formal one, with a content that is adjusted to the
conditions of the time and place. This follows from the circum-
stance that the standard of due process of law now functions in the
legal order as a norm dependent upon the mores of the day. Morals
are never absolute; they are but a "code of conduct more or less
haphazardly developed for groups, and varying with the nature and
circumstances of the group.' 347 Following and consequential to this
process, there develops the clashing and weighing of interests,
presently brought within the limits of the law. The whole and net
result is that "due process of law" grows coincidently with this
general evolutory movement of the social order, this continuous
development of oppositions, with their temporary merging and re-
conciliation.3 48 Running with the mass of apparent contradictions
and paradoxes, however, we may detect the formula which legal
philosophy deems desirable to refute the reproach of the past, and,
which it confidently believes adequate to meet the challenge of the
future.
346Cf. Poind, Spirit of the Common Law, r46 (i92i).
34 7Durant, Story of Philosophy, 314 (1926).348Ibid, 322.
